9ed15f405a
The is_dangerous_path() function only did exact string matching, allowing attackers to bypass protection by accessing subdirectories: - /etc was blocked but /etc/passwd was allowed - C:\Windows was blocked but C:\Windows\System32\... was allowed This minimal fix changes is_dangerous_path() to use PREFIX MATCHING: - Now blocks dangerous directories AND all their subdirectories - Paths like /etcbackup are still allowed (not under /etc) - No changes to DANGEROUS_PATHS list Security: - Fixes CWE-22: Path Traversal vulnerability - Reported by: Team off-course (K-Shield.Jr 15th) Fixes #312 Fixes #293
136 lines
3.0 KiB
Python
136 lines
3.0 KiB
Python
"""
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Security configuration and path validation constants
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This module contains security-related constants and configurations
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for file access control.
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"""
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from pathlib import Path
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# Dangerous paths that should never be scanned
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# These would give overly broad access and pose security risks
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DANGEROUS_PATHS = {
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"/",
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"/etc",
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"/usr",
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"/bin",
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"/var",
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"/root",
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"/home",
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"C:\\",
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"C:\\Windows",
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"C:\\Program Files",
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"C:\\Users",
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}
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# Directories to exclude from recursive file search
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# These typically contain generated code, dependencies, or build artifacts
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EXCLUDED_DIRS = {
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# Python
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"__pycache__",
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".venv",
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"venv",
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"env",
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".env",
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"*.egg-info",
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".eggs",
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"wheels",
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".Python",
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".mypy_cache",
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".pytest_cache",
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".tox",
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"htmlcov",
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".coverage",
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"coverage",
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# Node.js / JavaScript
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"node_modules",
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".next",
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".nuxt",
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"bower_components",
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".sass-cache",
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# Version Control
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".git",
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".svn",
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".hg",
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# Build Output
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"build",
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"dist",
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"target",
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"out",
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# IDEs
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".idea",
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".vscode",
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".sublime",
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".atom",
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".brackets",
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# Temporary / Cache
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".cache",
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".temp",
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".tmp",
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"*.swp",
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"*.swo",
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"*~",
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# OS-specific
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".DS_Store",
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"Thumbs.db",
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# Java / JVM
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".gradle",
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".m2",
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# Documentation build
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"_build",
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"site",
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# Mobile development
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".expo",
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".flutter",
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# Package managers
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"vendor",
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}
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def is_dangerous_path(path: Path) -> bool:
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"""
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Check if a path is in or under a dangerous directory.
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Uses PREFIX MATCHING to block dangerous directories AND their subdirectories.
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For example, if "/etc" is in DANGEROUS_PATHS, both "/etc" and "/etc/passwd"
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will be blocked.
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Args:
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path: Path to check
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Returns:
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True if the path is dangerous and should not be accessed
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Security:
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Fixes path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) reported in:
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- https://github.com/BeehiveInnovations/zen-mcp-server/issues/293
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- https://github.com/BeehiveInnovations/zen-mcp-server/issues/312
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"""
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try:
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resolved = path.resolve()
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resolved_str = str(resolved)
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# Check 1: Root directory (filesystem root)
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if resolved.parent == resolved:
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return True
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# Check 2: Exact match or subdirectory of dangerous paths
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for dangerous in DANGEROUS_PATHS:
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# Skip root "/" - already handled above
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if dangerous == "/":
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continue
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# Exact match
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if resolved_str == dangerous:
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return True
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# Subdirectory check: path starts with dangerous + separator
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# Use os.sep for platform-appropriate separator
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if resolved_str.startswith(dangerous + "/") or resolved_str.startswith(dangerous + "\\"):
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return True
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return False
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except Exception:
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return True # If we can't resolve, consider it dangerous
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